This paper discusses the relation between the concepts of stability and renegotiation. They have been shown to be incompatible in their standard definitions. Here we propose a way to restore their compatibility.
Now we can present the motivating example: consider the bimatrix game G in Fig. 1 , and let G(2) be the two-fold repetition of G. Write A= (a,a) , B=(b,/3) and C=(c,y) and consider the following strategy pair s* in G (2) Clearly s* satisfies Definition l. This strategy results in a payoff of 14 for each player. Van Damme shows that all PPEa of G(2) yield the same path as s*, and that this equilibrium component cannot be stable. The intuitive reason is as follows. Player 1 has a payoff of 14 if he plays as in (A, B) . If he deviates to b at t = 1, then player 2 should conclude that 1 will not play e because in this case (b at t = 1 ande at t = 2) player 1 gets at most 12, less than the 14 he gets in the equilibrium. Since we also have that a is dominated by b, player 2 should conclude that 1 will again play b after a deviation, but then bis best response is /3. This gives player 1 a payoff of 15 and he gains from deviating. The equilibrium is not stable.
Thus we have an incompatibility between the two concepts. The notion of PPE was meant to reflect players' interaction in situations with communication, while the concept of stability is purely non-cooperative. One can appeal to Schelling's (1960) principie of tacit bargaining to conclude that if the notion of PPE is compelling, then the players should accept it even in the case when no communication is possible. Now the two concepts can be confronted. This paper shows that the incompatibility between the two concepts may disappear once we take into account the following two claims:
Claim 1. The principie of tacit bargaining does not apply in general when communicatíon may take place.
Claim 2.
In the particular cases when the principie seerns to be applicable, the PPE rnay not be the 'good' definition of a renegotiation-proof equilibriurn if one considers stability issues.
Discussion of Claim 1
lf a definition of equilibriurn is to be interpreted as a theory of how players would behave, it is clear that any suggested strategy profile that does not conform to that definition will not be obeyed: players will find sorne incentive to deviate. This is true for the Nash equilibriurn and rnost of its refinernents. For instance, if players believe in the theory of perfect Nash equilibria, sorne player will unilaterally deviate frorn a non-perfect Nash equilibriurn because he or she will be afraid of 'trernbling hand' rnoves by other players. However, the sarne cannot be said about the PPE if the garne is to be played without cornrnunication. To see this, consider the garne in Fig. 2 . Only (b, e) and (e, r) are PPE. lf players believe in the theory of PPE, they will choose arnong these two pairs of strategies, but if they cannot cornrnunicate with each other, (a,/) cannot be discarded as an equilibriurn. Even if they are fervent believers of the PPE and know which are the PPEa of the garne, they are not clearly cornpelled to rnove frorn (a,/) if this strategy is seen as the status quo: they need cornmunication to go to either (b, e) or (e, r) and gain by this deviation. The knowledge of the theory of PPE is useful, in general, only if comrnunication exists ( that was precisely the motivation for renegotiation-proof equilibria). Other exarnples of this kind rnay occur when coalitions are permitted to deviate (e.g. in the coalition-proof Nash equilibriurn or in the strong Nash equilibriurn concepts): it rnay happen that a coalition is necessary to deviate frorn a strategy profile, but if several coalitions are possible, again cornmunication is necessary to decide which one will be formed. For very particular exarnples, however, it is true that communication is not necessary to apply the PPE. For example, in Fig. 3 , the knowledge and acceptance of the theory of PPE make players move simultaneously from (t, l) to (b, r). The reason is that there is only one place to go according to the theory. Therefore, in general, we need communication to apply the definition of PPE as a theory that predicts players' behavior. But then, stability in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (a purely non-cooperative concept), is not relevant and we do not have any incompatibility. Stability simply <loes not apply. To better see why, this section ends with two more examples to show how stability issues (and forward-induction arguments) may be ruled out when communication may take place.
Let us go back to our first example (Fig. 1) . If the PPE (s* as defined above) is proposed and communication can take place, then we find that player 1 will not deviate: if he does deviate at the first stage (as in the discussion for stability), at the beginning of the second stage he will find that player 2 will recall the first agreement (s *) which implies that C will follow, since it is an equilibrium. Of course, player 1 may defend his new proposal B based on his last deviation, but since B is now viewed as a deviation from C, it has no chance to survive because not ali players involved find it attractive.
As a last example consider the game of battle of the sexes in Fig. 4 . If player 2 has the opportunity to 'bum a dollar' before playing, it is well known that there is only one stable equilibrium (which is also the only one that survives the process of iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies) in which player 2 does not bum the dollar and (t, l) follows. With communication, however, (b, r) is still plausible: if (b, r) is decided and player 2 burns the dollar to show that he will play aggressively afterwards (to induce (t, l)), at the beginning of the second stage he will hear from player 1 something like: "OK, you burnt a dollar, so what? We planned to play now (b, r) and we shall do it that way since it is an equilibrium; your deviation is worthless so you had better follow the equilibrium path."
Discussion of Claim 2
For the cases in which the principie of tacit bargaining is applicable and no communication is necessary, to propose a PPE as a solution seems reasonable (e.g. when only one such equilibrium exists as in the game in Fig. 3 ), but then, this PPE may not be stable. An illustration of this is the example in Fig. l . But one can argue that if that game is to be played without communication and if players believe in the theories of both renegotiation-proof and stable equilibria, then it is not clear why at the beginning they chose s, the Pareto-optimal within the subgame perfect equilibria. They are now aware of the notion of stability and know that a deviation will occur. Therefore, the PPE is not the 'good' renegotiation-proof concept in this case. Players should better concentrate their attention on the set of strategy profiles that are 'optimal within the set of stable equilibria'. The formal definition of this 'Paretostable equilibrium' is as follows:
Definition 2. The strategy profile s is a Pareto-stable equilibrium (PSE) of G(l) if and only if it is a stable equilibrium (SE) of G that is not strictly dominated by any other equilibrium.
Inductively, s is a PSE of G(t + 1) iff ( 1) s is a SE of G(t + 1), Remark 2. Since SEa always exist when the sets of strategies are compact, the existence of PSEa is immediate for those games with a compact set of outcomes in SEa.
Remark 3. In van Damme's example, it is easy to check that the only two PSEa are: (i) play B in the first period and either B or C in the second after any history and (ii) play C in the first period and either B or C in the second after any history.
Final comments
Pareto-perfectness is a definition that is very generally applicable. Stability, however, is only meaningful in a very special kind of situation. To make the point simpler, consider van Damme's condition for stability (in the sense of forward induction) in two-player games:
A solution concept S is consistent with forward induction on the class of generic 2-person games if p E S for any path p for which there exists a player i who by unilaterally deviating from p can enforce that a subgame is reached for which exactly one solution (according to S) yields this player more than p does and for which all other solutions yield this player less (van Damme, 1987a) .
It is clear that, for this definition to be applicable (in the sense that it restricts the set of solutions), one needs a coincidence to happen (' ... exactly one solution ... '). Furthermore, the cases in which both PPE and SE are applicable concepts are even more restricted: in addition, one needs the coincidence that makes the principie of tacit bargaining adequate (as in the discussion of Claim 2). As a result, only in a very particular set of games can both concepts be contrasted. It has been shown that, in this case, the definition of PPE can be modified to be a 'reasonable' renegotiation-proof equilibrium concept when players accept the theory of stability (they interpret deviations from a Nash equilibrium, notas mistakes, but as something to be rationalized).
